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HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CONSEQUENT TO 
TRANSSHIPMENT PRACTICES IN FISHERIES 
Chelsey Marto1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pope Francis once said, “[h]uman rights are not only violated by 
terrorism, repression, and assassination, but also by unfair economic 
structures that create huge inequalities.”2 Pertinent to economic activity 
on the high seas remains the fishing industry, where innumerable 
individuals are kept, out of sight, unnoticed, and exploited for their work 
over the course of long stretches of time.3 This phenomenon is partly 
because of the process of transshipment, which helps provide segments of 
the fishing industry with the ability to retain and manipulate workers 
thereon for months, if not years. 4 
 Simply stated, transshipment involves offloading catch from a fishing 
vessel to a refrigerated cargo vessel off the port.5 Often, this is done out of 
sight and out on the high seas, where oversight and regulation are virtually 
non-existent and no specific country has jurisdiction over the area.6 
Consequently, this activity allows for nefarious activity, including human 
trafficking and other human rights abuses.7 Increased regulation and 
oversight of transshipment practices remain necessary in countering the 
reprehensible human rights violations existent within the fishing industry.8 
 Transshipment describes the process of transferring fish from a 
smaller fishing vessel to a larger mothership, usually on the high seas and 
far from shore.9 In principle, this practice is a benefit to fishing fleets 
because vessels can offload their catch while at sea and continue fishing 
                                            
 1.  J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maine School of Law. 
 2.  Mark Rice-Oxley, Pope Francis: the Humble Pontiff with Practical Approach to 
Poverty, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 13, 2013, 3:35 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/mar/13/jorge-mario-bergoglio-pope-poverty [https://perma.cc/5N2D-W8UG].  
 3.  David A. Kroodsma et al., The Global View of Transshipment: Revised Preliminary 
Findings, SKYTRUTH AND GLOB. FISH WATCH 1, 16 (Aug. 2017). 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  See id. at 1, 17. 
 7.  Id. at 1. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 5.  
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without going back to shore, allowing fishing companies to reduce fuel 
costs and catch more fish for market faster.10 This practice remains 
technically legal, with caveats, throughout most of the world. However, 
transshipment is not closely monitored and many loopholes exist, allowing 
for both destructive and illegal behavior to continue happening, including 
various human rights abuses.11 When conducted intentionally, 
transshipment allows fishing companies “to avoid higher duty rates levied 
on certain countries, avoid import restrictions such as visa and quota 
restrictions, or make use of a special trade program to drastically lower 
duty rates.”12 Similarly, lack of regulation over transshipment practices 
allow for crews to be kept at sea for months, if not years, at a time without 
getting back to the port, making it difficult to report on or escape from 
emotional, mental, or physical abuse, poor working conditions, violence, 
or murder on board fishing vessels.13  
 Commercial fishing remains one of the most dangerous professions 
in the world with extremely high injury and mortality rates brought on by 
unsafe working conditions onboard the fishing vessels.14 Additionally, 
cases of human rights violations have become increasingly regular over 
the past several years.15 Moreover, cases of unexplained disappearances 
of workers onboard fishing vessels has also increased in frequency.16 
Consequently, transshipment is considered one of the most high-risk 
activities in the industry by opening the door for violations such as those 
described above.17 
 This comment examines how the practice of transshipment and how 
the lack of regulation, oversight, and other avenues for international action 
has allowed human rights abuses to occur. The patchwork of regulation 
                                            
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Katherine Martinko, How the Fishing Industry Gets Away with Everything from 
Illegal Catches to Human Slavery, TREEHUGGER (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.treehugger
.com/green-food/how-fish-industry-gets-away-everything-illegal-catches-human-
slavery.html [https://perma.cc/7AZK-8TUK]. 
 12.  What is Transshipment?, INFORMED TRADE: INTERNATIONAL IMPORT/EXPORT, 
http://www.itintl.com/what-is-transshipment.html [https://perma.cc/599A-W8AD]. 
 13.  Wendy Laursen, Human Rights in Focus, THE MAR. EXEC. (May 4, 2017, 01:52 
AM), http://maritime-executive.com/article/human-rights-in-focus [https://perma.cc/
58MU-932T]. 
 14.  Fisheries Abuses and Related Deaths at Sea in the Pacific Region, HUMAN RTS. AT 
SEA 5 (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
HRAS-Fisheries-Abuse-Investigative-Report-Dec-2017-SECURED.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZD6W-CLSQ].  
 15.  Id. at 3.  
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. at 4.  
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currently available will be examined and criticized in terms of its 
effectiveness in addressing the issue. Additionally, this comment will 
discuss the alternative solutions proposed over the past couple of years and 
ultimately suggest the best course of action for networks of international 
law and public policy to move forward in shifting from a lack of 
understanding, regard, and neglect of the issue, to implementing plausible 
and effective strategies concerning the correction of past abuses and 
prevention of future abuses against workers in the fishing industry.  
II. PRESENTING THE PROBLEM 
A. The Practice of Transshipment 
Human rights abuses at sea have a surplus of root causes: “greed, 
cultural inequity, corruption, and global and domestic economic 
conditions.”18 Additionally, with the environmental concern of 
overfishing, companies must go farther away from shore than ever before 
to catch an adequate quantity of fish.19 This has been particularly true since 
the mid-1990’s, because the demand for fish has been steadily increasing, 
while the supply of fish has steadily been decreasing.20 This increases the 
demand for transshipment opportunities, which allows fishing vessels to 
stay out at sea for longer periods of time without having to return to shore 
very often and increases the ease with which they can commit such 
violations without getting caught or reprimanded for doing so.21 
Those engaging in transshipment practices have a large economic 
incentive to continue transshipment practices. Rendering frequent trips to 
shore unnecessary reduces both fuel costs and increases the amount of time 
available to continue fishing, thereby increasing the supply available to be 
sold at market, which increases the revenue.22 Additionally, because labor 
conditions are not strictly monitored, companies can underpay or refuse to 
pay workers without facing legal repercussions for doing so and, again, 
                                            
 18.  Sarah G. Lewis, et al., Human Rights and the Sustainability of Fisheries, FISHWISE 
381 (2017), https://users.soe.ucsc.edu/~msmangel/Lewis%20et%20al%202017%20
human% 20rights%20and%20fisheries%20sustainability.pdf.  
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Daniel Pauly & Dirk Zeller, Catch Reconstructions Reveal that Global Marine 
Fisheries Catches are Higher than Reported and Declining, NATURE COMM. 7 (Jan. 19, 
2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms10244 [https://perma.cc/6UZP-RC25?
type=image].  
 21.  Lewis, et al., supra note 18, at 381.  
 22.  Kroodsma, supra note 3, at 1. 
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decrease the fixed costs otherwise associated with the fishing industry.23 
From a purely economic perspective, it remains in companies’ best interest 
to continue such practices, especially when companies are based on 
developing countries where money is rationed.24 
Transshipment is a common practice involved in unregulated fishing, 
which has been linked to numerous organized, transnational crimes at sea, 
including human trafficking, smuggling of migrant workers, and forced 
labor.25 Though numerous attempts to end this practice have arisen, entire 
fishing industries are still heavily reliant on the practice, particularly those 
in developing countries with limited resources or ability to monitor and 
enforce regulations on international waters. Consequently, the workers on 
those ships are more vulnerable than workers from countries with tighter 
regulations.26  
B. Examples of Human Rights Violations 
 Slave labor lowers shipping costs, incentivizing shipping companies 
from impoverished nations to recruit workers through unethical means that 
violate human rights laws.27 Workers are often recruited by manning 
agencies in developing countries, offered false promises of compensation. 
Later, they are asked to pay agencies as justification for indentured 
servitude, robbed of documents that promised compensation, and then 
forced into slavery.28 Usually, they are either underpaid or unpaid and held 
at sea for years, where human rights violations thereafter continue.29  
 Additionally, workers are often forced to work in horrendous 
conditions, such as malnourishment and lack of sleep, with only sparse 
visits from the mothership to serve as ineffective oversight of the 
transshipment practices.30 Ships are usually at sea for months at a time, 
giving fishermen an avenue for conducting cruel and inhumane 
                                            
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Charlotte Middlehurst, Transshipping Spurs Trade in Illegal Fishing Led by 
Russia, CHINA DIALOGUE, (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.iuuwatch.eu/2017/03/transshipping-
spurs-trade-illegal-fishing-led-russia [https://perma.cc/AY54-F28U].  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Christopher Ewell, et al., Potential Ecological and Social Benefits of a Moratorium 
on Transshipment on the High Seas, 81 MARINE POL’Y 293, 293 (2017). 
 28.  Id. at 293-94. 
 29.  Id. at 294. 
 30.  See Katarina Zimmer, How Seafood’s “Dark Web” Obscures Fraud, Fish 
Laundering, and Slavery on the High Seas, THE NEW FOOD ECON. (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://newfoodeconomy.com/seafood-dark-web-fish-fraud-transshipment/
?mc_cid=809b7dada3&mc_eid=f5333d4f15 [https://perma.cc/838Z-SXG7]. 
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confinement of countless poverty-stricken, illiterate workers who were 
forced into signing contracts they did not understand. Often, workers are 
bought, sold, kept on vessels for months, forced to work twenty-hour shifts 
by taking methamphetamines, and endure beatings, torture, and execution-
style killings.31 
 Specific examples of this run abundant. 32 Frequent cases of physical 
and sexual violence against crew members, assaults on crew members’ 
mental health which have regularly been linked to self-harm, frequent 
denial of wages, crew members being forced to work under dangerous and 
even fatal working conditions daily, inadequate food and water supply that 
is safe for consumption, and cases of human trafficking all run rampant.33  
C. Statistical Data Regarding Transshipment and Human Rights 
Abuses 
 Data involving the scale and conduct of transshipment within the 
industry has been incredibly difficult to collect, given the vast size and 
rural nature of worldwide fishing regions, as well as the lack of oversight 
on board.34 In fact, the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization contends 
that approximately half of the production estimates in the fishing industry 
off the Pacific region are guesswork.35 
 Major discrepancies exist between the reported data and reality 
regarding the fishing industry in many developing countries, such as 
Thailand. Transshipment dates and locations, when compared with data 
gathered from the European Union’s Directorate-General for Health and 
Food Safety’s auditing team, revealed major discrepancies in 
transshipment dates, with Thai ships reportedly having unknown locations 
for products ranging from eighteen days to four months.36 Additionally, 
                                            
 31.  Martinko, supra note 11. 
 32.  See Fisheries Abuses and Related Deaths at Sea in the Pacific Region, supra note 
14, at 5-7 (provides a detailed description of nearly fifteen case studies discovered 
involving human rights violations at sea over the past decade, several of which were 
directly linked to the transshipment practices their vessels partook in). 
 33.  See id.  
 34.  See id. at 4.  
 35.  Fisheries of the Pacific Islands, RAP PUBL’NS 3 (Mar. 2011), http://www.fao.org
/docrep/014/i2092e/ i2092e00.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXT9-NBWU]. 
 36.  Francisco Blaha, The EU Delivers Another Bad Tuna Compliance Report to 
Thailand, IUUWATCH (Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.iuuwatch.eu/2017/03/eu-delivers-
another-bad-tunacompliance-report-thailand/ [https://perma.cc/2PUN-X3P9].  
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locations being fished were different from ones notated by the Thai fishing 
industry themselves.37 
 Recent reports indicate that nearly forty percent of likely and 
potential rendezvous from legal and reported transshipment courses occur 
by vessels run by countries with little regulation and oversight, with 
another forty percent of likely and potential rendezvous occurring on the 
high seas, where no one country in particular has jurisdiction over.38 
Additionally, studies show that fishermen in countries with increased 
regulation are more likely to move to another country with decreased 
regulation than to comply with the increased regulations and tighter 
restrictions in their home countries.39  
 The regulations regarding transshipment practices are patchworked; 
there is no cohesive strategy and oversight, no regulation clearly 
explaining proper etiquette over transshipment practices to ensure illegal 
fishing and human rights violations do not occur.40 Different countries 
have different regulations, resources, and capabilities.41 Additionally, 
while some countries signed agreements to diminish human rights 
violations on the high seas, other countries have avoided being held 
accountable for nefarious activity on the seas, with little to no 
consequence.42 Refusing to hold certain countries responsible for 
unethical employment practices in the fishing industry makes eradicating 
human trafficking and other inhumane exploitation practices 
extraordinarily difficult and, consequently, action taken to counter these 
abuses remains limited in the countries causing the most devastation.43    
III. CURRENT LAW 
Certain countries, including member states within the European Union 
as well as the United States, have a surplus of regulations regarding 
transshipment practices. Others, however, have little to no regulatory 
framework established regarding transshipment practices, which often 
provides a surplus of avenues the ship’s operator can take to lower various 
costs by abusing workers.  
                                            
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Kroodsma, supra note 3, at 1, 3. 
 39.  Id. at 15. 
 40.  Id. at 17. 
 41.  Id. at 3. 
 42.  See Sofia Galani, The “New” Human Rights at Sea Debate, The Maritime 
Executive (Feb. 12, 2018), available at https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials
/the-new-human-rights-at-sea-debate [https://perma.cc/3DH6-XXAU].  
 43.  Id.  
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A. European Union and United States Laws Regarding 
Transshipment 
The United States has very detailed restrictions regarding 
transshipment practices, including prohibitions on transshipment practices 
involving ships equipped with purse seine gear, prohibitions on off-shore 
transshipment without a Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC) observer present, prohibitions on receiving 
transshipped fish from more than one vessel without an independent 
observer present, and prohibitions on transshipping goods with an 
unauthorized vessel or a vessel from a non-cooperating member or non-
member country.44 These prohibitions, among several others, are designed 
to reduce cases of illegal fishing and various human rights abuses carried 
out against migrant workers.45  
The European Union has also adopted a regulatory framework to 
counter unethical transshipment practices on the high seas. As a part of 
these regulations, all transshipment operations outside of EU-controlled 
regions are strictly prohibited and transshipment practices can only take 
place in designated ports within the EU Member States’ control.46 
Additionally, all transshipment practices must be recorded in a catch 
certificate to enable better monitoring of transshipment operations.47 
B. Patchwork of Regulations 
Many other countries, particularly Asian nations off the Pacific, have 
little to no regulatory framework, which allows for many more human 
rights violations to occur at sea. This is largely because developing 
countries with weak regulatory frameworks have no independent observer, 
verification or monitoring of transnational criminal activities or human 
rights violations, nor adequate and well-enforced regulations.48 
Additionally, transshipment poses a greater challenge on the high seas, 
because practices are barely regulated and no specific country has 
jurisdiction over the area.49  
                                            
 44.  See 50 CFR § 300.216 (2012). 
 45.  See id.   
 46.  Handbook on the Practical Application of the IUU Regulation, European 
Commission, (Sep. 29, 2008), 14, https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs
/body/handbook_original_en.pdf. [https://perma.cc/K7ZA-BCBF].  
 47.  Id. at 36. 
 48.  See id. at 86. 
 49. Zimmer, supra note 30, at 5. 
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There are no minimum standards of working conditions adopted 
internationally.50 Consequently, many worker’s fishing vessels are left to 
the mercy of their operators, who frequently exploit their workers for 
profit.51 Vessel owners are usually not onboard ships when abuses happen 
and the skipper, who often has authority to act in the capacity of the owner 
when they are absent, often does not accept enough responsibility over 
crew members’ safety.52 
Additionally, loopholes exist regarding the registration of boats within 
specific jurisdictions. In fact, one of the primary reasons why so many 
human rights violations occur is because policies on transshipment vary 
by exclusive economic zones, flag states, and regions around the world, 
where regions with relatively strong regulatory frameworks have tighter 
controls than regions with weak regulatory frameworks.53  Often, 
industries can register in a third state, of which neither the crew nor the 
vessels originated.54 This practice, known as “flags of convenience,” 
requires the flag State to assume responsibility over regulation of the 
vessel, with limited exceptions.55 This leads to a lack of legal jurisdiction 
over the boat, which exacerbates the problem of unsafe working conditions 
and human rights abuses and diminishes legal responsibilities that 
otherwise would be incurred by the fishing company registered in a third 
state.56  
International laws do not address the content and scope of the problem, 
nor the complexities intricately interwoven in the fishing and processing 
industries.57 The international legal framework does not target serious 
infringements on human rights with deterrent actions that deprive 
offenders of economic benefits derived from illicit activities, with the 
monitoring, control, and surveillance systems scarcely used or poorly 
executed.58 This is particularly true in more undeveloped regions where 
                                            
 50.  James Sloan, The Legal Challenges of Improving Working Conditions on 
Commercial Fishing Vessels, SIWATIBAU & SLOAN 4 (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.
sas.com.fj/ocean-law-bulletins/the-challenge-of-improving-working-conditions-on-
commercial-fishing-vessels  [https://perma.cc/H6JS-2TSF]. 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Kroodsma, supra note 3, at 2, 5. 
 54.  Id. at 11-12. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id.   
 57.  Georgi Gotev, Thai Seafood Products could be Banned in Europe, Warns MEP, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015
/jul/23/thai-seafood-products-banned-europe-mep-gabriel-mato [https://perma.cc/NQV2-
WQYU]. 
 58.  Id.  
2019] Human Rights: Transshipment 41 
 
the threats of human rights abuses are greater, and the governments in 
those regions are unwilling to cooperate with the developed world’s 
standards; primarily due to its increase in cost, time, and lack of incentive 
to comply given the absence of deterrent actions taken by more developed 
countries to encourage more ethical conduct on behalf of the loosely 
regulated nations.59 
IV. PROPOSED STRATEGIES 
A Global effort is required to appropriately address this problem. 
Though traditional legal tactics are generally not effective for the reasons 
addressed above, many Non-Governmental Organizations and 
governments from developed countries, including the European Union, 
have increased their global focus on this issue and have launched several 
strategies to help rectify the problem.60 
A. Bans 
Perhaps the most zealous measure often proposed are attempts to ban 
transshipment practices at sea entirely. Though this would clearly 
eradicate any problems with transshipment that currently exist if strictly 
followed, the practicality of this measure leaves something to be desired.61  
This strategy remains unrealistic given the legal framework regarding 
transshipment internationally. Due to Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (hereafter “RFMOs”), laws regarding fisheries 
management and the fishing industry are primarily overseen by 
commissions from different countries around the globe. Where members 
make proposals and vote on a consensus-basis, providing ample 
opportunities for countries that do not agree with the proposals to opt out 
and suffer little to no consequences for opting out of tighter regulations.62 
Often, these proposals impose economic hardships on fishing companies 
in developing countries, whose economic incentives lay in continuing 
transshipment practices and the dishonest behavior related to illegal 
fishing and human trafficking that is often times involved.63 Consequently, 
imposition of transshipment bans remain both incredibly rare and largely 
                                            
 59.  See id. 
 60.  Danielle Beurteaux, A High-Tech Solution to End Illegal Fishing, GREENBIZ (Aug. 
3, 2017), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/high-tech-solution-end-illegal-fishing [https://
perma.cc/MC42-A4TY].  
 61.  See Ewell, et al., supra note 27, at 293-94. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id.  
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ineffective, given the incentives in continuing these practices and the 
relative ease at which fishing companies can avoid running their industries 
in countries with tighter regulations, allowing them to ignore any 
transshipment restrictions or bans without facing negative repercussions 
for doing so.64  
B. Technological Tracking 
 Another proposed strategy remains: increasing technological tracking 
onboard all vessels used by fishing industries, regardless of ship size.65 
This practice can take various forms, including digitizing records, 
installing mandatory on-board cameras to monitor transshipment 
practices, adopting global catch documentation schemes, mandating 
vessel tracking, and requiring unique identifiers for all fishing vessels.66 
This would essentially serve as an expansion of practices generally 
conducted on board larger vessels already and extending it to smaller ships 
that currently lack the ability to purchase the devices and, consequently, 
are usually the culprits when human rights violations do occur, because of 
how little transparency remains onboard.67 
 Similar to problems associated with bans, technological tracking will 
remain largely ineffective if attempts to impose new protocol relating to 
tracking is instituted by laws and regulations. Companies economically 
advantaged by transshipment practices have little incentive to change 
protocol without outside forces penalizing them for continuing, given the 
opportunities for countries to opt out of multi-nation regulations and the 
ability of companies located in countries that do increase restrictions on 
transshipment practices to move to countries that do not regulate 
transshipment practices closely. Conversely, incentivizing companies to 
institute technological tracking capabilities through imposing sanctions 
and refusing imports of companies that do not comply will most likely be 
more effective, because it detracts from the economic incentives 
companies have in utilizing transshipment abilities in exploiting workers 
for economic gain and replaces this incentive with negative economic 
repercussions for continuing transshipment practices. 
                                            
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Middlehurst, supra note 25. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  See id.  
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C. Buyer Supply Chain Management 
 Another proposed strategy for combatting human rights violations 
during transshipment involves incentivizing large-scale buyers ensuring 
that the seafood suppliers do not use abused, trafficked, or underage 
workers through direct regulation of suppliers or third-party 
certifications.68 If the fishing industries practice nefarious activities at sea, 
corporations originally demanding fish from that particular source seek 
out other suppliers who do not practice procedures that frequently lead to 
human rights abuses, thus rooting fish illegally caught out through the 
supply chain.69  
 Third party certifications have little potential in the future, given that 
the few existing third parties generally have not certified any fishing 
companies in problem countries, such as Thailand, and have a limited 
presence in such areas.70 When a presence is shown, it remains extremely 
limited and, consequently, the impact remains too small to accomplish 
major reforms as well.71  
 Direct regulation of suppliers has an immediate impact on countries 
frequently engaging in illegal fishing practices, because it incentivizes 
buyers to scrutinize their suppliers’ practices to protect their own 
reputations.72 That said, these practices are also limited in their ability to 
address larger labor problems in the fisheries and do not directly address 
the working conditions themselves, nor the benefits suppliers have for 
continuing these practices.73 Additionally, private sector responses, such 
as this, are limited in scope, because it is left up to the independent 
corporation on whether they want to ban fish caught through unethical 
means or not.74 
D. Anti-Trafficking Measures 
 Another strategy that is often used as a remedial measure for 
addressing past abuses involve various anti-trafficking measures. Anti-
trafficking measures are usually appropriate after labor violations have 
                                            
 68.  Melissa Marschke & Peter Vandergeest, Slavery Scandals: Unpacking Labour 
Challenges and Policy Responses within the Off-Shore Fisheries Sector, 68 Marine Pol’y 
39, 43 (2016).  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. at 43-44. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. at 44.  
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already occurred.75 This is because these practices involve rescuing abused 
workers, boarding them in safe houses, and providing legal representation 
for abused workers.76 
 Though this is often a stable remedial measure, anti-trafficking 
measures are often unhelpful in changing workers’ rights or changing the 
broad legal landscape.77 Without addressing the problem at its source, 
many trafficked workers who receive remedies through anti-trafficking 
measures will just be replaced by other migrant workers who then get 
taken advantage of as before.78 
E. Sanctions and Import Restrictions 
Another proposed solution is imposing sanctions and import 
restrictions on goods and services coming from countries engaging in 
transshipment practices without tightly enforced regulations regarding the 
practice.79 Most notably, in recent years the European Union and the 
United States have frequently proposed imposition of sanctions as an 
effective solution, responding to transshipment and “illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated” (hereafter “IUU”) fishing conducted by the Thai fishing 
industries.80 Sanctions were threatened and ultimately imposed on 
Thailand until the Thai government implemented strategies to curtail 
human rights violations consequent to transshipment practices, including: 
improving labor and management services by filling labor shortages; 
ensuring proper recruitment and protection of migrant workers; improving 
inspection of labor conditions and criminal activity; and creating avenues 
officials can take when informing workers of their rights and employers 
of their responsibilities to their employees.81 This practice incentivized the 
Thai government to increase regulations and tighten surveillance over 
labor practices of migrant workers aboard and increasing controls and 
transparency over transshipment practices.82 
                                            
 75.  See generally id. at 42.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  See Gotev, supra note 57. 
 80.  Lorenza Errighi et al., Global Supply Chains: Insights into the Thai Seafood Sector, 
ILO ASIA-PAC. WORKING PAPER SERIES 14, 26 (2016). 
 81.  Id. at 26. 
 82.  Id.  
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1. Drawbacks of Sanctions 
 That said, this solution is not without drawbacks. First, enforcing 
safer labor practices through sanctions is a slow-moving process, often 
taking years to correct the problem.83 Coercing foreign governments to 
comply with these demands forces the foreign government itself to initiate 
domestic changes by developing strategies, instituting regulations, and 
increasing government surveillance over the industry until the new 
practices are sustainable.84 This often requires years of slow-moving 
progress; there is no quick fix when implementing major changes 
regarding large industries.  
Second, imposing sanctions, instead of directly implementing 
regulations through a top-down approach, inherently provides affected 
countries with additional alternative routes in practicing business without 
the same level of coercion necessarily implicated when regulations are 
directly imposed. For example, if an insufficient number of countries 
attempt to curtail unethical transshipment practices through sanctions, 
countries utilizing transshipment practices for economic gain and business 
growth may not have a large enough incentive to change, because the 
economic loss consequent to countries imposing sanctions may be less 
than the loss fishing industries are projected to incur by discontinuing the 
transshipment practices. Additionally, changes to transshipment practices 
are ultimately dependent on the country engaging in unethical 
transshipment practices changing their practices in favor of more ethical 
maneuvers, which may not match the proposed strategies from the 
sanctioning countries. This renders the action on behalf of the sanctioned 
countries less effective and less expedient than a top-down approach 
would necessarily create.  
 That said, out of the five strategies addressed above, sanctions are the 
best strategy in achieving concrete steps towards improvement in 
ultimately eradicating unethical transshipment practices. Though 
sanctions make the path towards change slower than a more expedient, 
top-down approach, it remains the most plausible and pragmatic 
alternative available in causing incremental changes in the fishing 
industry. Sanctions function to dilute and, ultimately, eradicate the 
economic advantage that industries maintain when engaging in 
transshipment practices by causing the incurrence of a larger cost than 
gained through transshipment practices.  
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V. EFFECTIVENESS OF PAST SANCTIONS 
Past implementation of sanctions by the United States and the 
European Union has yielded desirable effects in curtailing the issue of 
human rights violations, criminal behavior, and IUU fishing in the 
fisheries. Past sanctions have been primarily centered around addressing 
issues in IUU fishing and various other issues in illegal fishing practices, 
such as overexploitation of fisheries and annual global financial losses due 
to unreported and illegal fishing.85 Though frequently not targeting 
transshipment practices specifically,86 existing sanctions on illegal fishing 
practices present a framework for the scope and strength of sanctions 
recommended and illustrates the current downfalls in existing sanctions 
programs regarding similar fishing practices.   
A. EU Sanctions on IUU Fishing 
Transshipment is often associated with IUU fishing, which the 
European Union has enforced strict regulations over.. Included in this, the 
EU has listed various third countries that failed to cooperate with the EU’s 
guidelines regarding IUU regulations and, if these countries continued 
these practices, the EU implemented trading bans between EU member 
states and listed countries.87 Included on the list of unacceptable activities 
are unreported transshipment practices, fishing without a license or 
registration, fishing in a closed area or season, joint fishing with other 
companies that engage in IUU fishing, and obstructing the work of 
inspectors searching for compliance with proper fishing procedures.88 
Bans are held in place until transparency of the offending country’s fishing 
practices is increased and concrete measures are taken to remand the 
issue.89  
 Since 2012, the European Union has threatened sanctions against at 
least eight different Third World Countries: Fiji, Belize, Cambodia, Sri 
Lanka, Panama, Vanuatu, Guinea, and Togo.90 The European Union gave 
these countries a reasonable amount of time to start identifying problems 
in current fishing practices and implementing strategies to combat these 
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shortcomings.91 Each country was given a warning that if practices did not 
change, further action would be taken, namely, trading sanctions and bans 
on products imported to the EU.92 Within a year of developing this list, 
only three countries remained on the lists and sanctions were implemented 
upon them. 93 Every other country implemented adequate changes based 
upon the threats of sanctions alone. 
 Traditionally, sanctions on the fishing industries levied by countries 
in the European Union were applied inconsistently, with every nation state 
applying different criteria discretionarily.94 EU regulations regarding 
sanctions establish a legal framework relating to fishing, but it is 
ultimately the responsibility of each member state to enforce the sanctions. 
Due to the independent nature of the enforcement by the EU, application 
varies significantly.95 Additionally, the current point system established 
by the EU, which determines the gravity of infringements based upon set 
criteria, is not applied consistently by each country.96 Consequently, many 
nations still show an unwillingness to enforce the current EU policies 
related to improper fishing procedures by other nations, diminishing the 
deterrence value of existing sanctions.97 
 Between various member states involved in the European Union, 
stark differences remain regarding enforcement of sanctions over illegal 
fishing practices.98 For example, in 2014, France, Germany, and Finland 
only had two serious infringements between them and zero penalty points 
given, whereas Italy reported 538 serious infringements and Spain 
reported 805 serious infringements, indicating that some member states in 
the European Union either do not investigate illegal fishing practices 
thoroughly or they refuse to report infringements when they are found.99  
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 Other problems in enforcing sanctions, penalties, and other deterrent 
forces remain. Studies indicate that fines for illegal fishing are rare and, 
when implemented, are often relatively low in cost; again, this renders the 
deterrent value in such action very small.100 Additionally, in a study 
evaluating enforcement of EU fishery laws in Poland, Spain, England, 
France, the Netherlands, and Ireland, all of the countries studied 
demonstrated noticeable delay in implementing the laws on fishing 
industries grounded domestically and all of their enforcement practices 
lack transparency, leading to serious contemplation of whether EU 
regulations are being met at all.101 
B. United States Sanctions on IUU Fishing 
The International Stability Operations Association102 encourages that 
sanctions should be so severe as to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate 
IUU fishing and strip countries engaging in such behavior of any economic 
incentive to continue these practices.103 The United States regularly 
sanctions countries engaged in such behavior, with cases often settling for 
several hundred thousand dollars and various other criminal sanctions, 
including forfeiting catch or ships and implementing tracking systems on 
ships.104 
 Though the United States’ sanctions remain among the strongest in 
the world, more is needed to combat illegal fishing practices occurring 
during the process of transshipment. Various acts like the Lacey Act help 
combat some forms of illegal fishing by prohibiting trade in fish illegally 
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caught, possessed, transported, or sold.105 That said, due to the 
transnational nature of the crimes committed and the lack of transparency 
of fishing practices, enforcement of regulations and sanctions against IUU 
practices are often indirect and go unnoticed until after the violation has 
occurred, rendering a halt of the illegal practices altogether extremely 
difficult.106 
Though enforcement of sanctions related to illegal fishing practices 
that involve transshipment and human rights violations remain relatively 
rare across the board, when sanctions are seriously threatened or levied 
against the offending country, positive deterrent effects and substantial 
progress made on combatting human rights violations on board fishing 
vessels generally occur.107  
C. Case Study: Thailand 
Given a variety of factors, including rapid industrialization, rapid 
increases in technological costs, and depleted fisheries, profit margins 
drastically narrowed in Thai fisheries over the past thirty years, forcing 
operators to find new ways of reducing their costs.108 Consequently, many 
vessel operators turned to human trafficking and other means of illegal 
employment and working conditions to supply their crew and decrease 
various labor costs.109 Additionally, many fishing companies turned to 
transshipment practices that enabled operators to stay at sea for vast 
stretches of time, keeping slave workers at sea for weeks, months, or years 
at a time.110 Working conditions involved varying degrees of poor 
treatment, rights, and conditions for crew members, ranging from 
infractions from traditional labor standards to major human rights 
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abuses.111 The Thai government refused to respond to the issue, turning a 
blind eye to even the most egregious practices, until the European Union 
and the United States decided to implement various sanction programs to 
make current fishery practices economically disadvantageous.112  
As a response to the human rights violations epidemic, the European 
Commission issued Thailand a yellow card in April 2015, identifying it as 
a possible non-cooperating country in the fight against IUU fishing, with 
a subsequent “red card” leading to European Union Sanctions.113 The 
United States also heightened scrutiny over Thai fisheries, increasing 
threats of sanctions if prompt action was not taken to curtail illegal fishing 
and the human rights violations involved.114  
In response, Thailand overhauled their fishing industry’s monitoring, 
control, and management regimes. 115  New interagency inspection 
frameworks were established and now there are teams of individuals 
inspecting the fishing vessels every time they depart and arrive in a port. 
116  Laws and penalties for violations of laws and human rights have been 
increased substantially. 117  Though further action is needed to eradicate 
the human rights violations at sea, threats of sanctions were effective in 
getting the Thai government to respond to the human rights violations 
occurring due to heinous activity on the high seas.118  
D. Case Study: New Zealand 
 In 2009 and 2011, research revealed that New Zealand fisheries were 
engaging in illegal fishing practices resulting in IUU fishing and a variety 
of human rights violations carried against migrant workers on board.119 
Many of these fishing vessels are owned by South Korean companies that 
trafficked Indonesian migrant workers and held workers under severely 
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exploitative working conditions.120 These conditions included: physical 
and verbal  abuse; being forced to work days without rest; earning between 
$260 and $460 a month before paying most of it back to “agents;” being 
forced to stand in the hot sun for hours if they worked too slow; denied 
proper safety conditions; made to work while sick and injured; were 
constantly beaten; and denied proper food, clothing, and showers. 121 
 Publicizing this research, and threatening New Zealand fisheries with 
negative international perceptions of all New Zealand exports created the 
incentive New Zealand needed to start reforming their fishing industry.122 
Authorities have sufficiently modified the existing fishing management 
regime to address violations caused by illegal fishing practices and have 
guaranteed workers on fishing vessels protections under domestic labor 
laws, including increased oversight and tracking of ships.123 
 Evaluating past approaches in combating IUU fishing as well as 
previous case studies combatting similar issues provides a surplus of 
potential strategies going forward that can ultimately provide solutions to 
the problem of human rights violations occurring during the transshipment 
process.  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS GOING FORWARD 
To combat human rights violations at sea, world leaders, including 
members states in the European Union and the United States, must act 
against both fishing industries that continue unregulated transshipment 
practices as well as the industry’s countries that turn a blind eye towards 
such abuses. One of the primary alternatives for effectively curtailing 
clandestine transshipment practices is to impose rigid sanctions upon 
countries engaging in such behavior.124 That said, the current sanctioning 
procedures practiced by world leaders need to be strengthened  for this 
strategy to be effective.125  
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First, sanctions need to be uniformly applied to countries that turn a 
blind eye to transshipment practices by all member states in the European 
Union. It cannot be left up to each member state on how they enforce such 
sanctions, because, in the past, when such freedom was given to member 
states, certain states would not enforce the regulations consistently, 
negating the deterrent value of the sanctions to begin with and allowing 
transshipment practices to continue.126 Corresponding with this uniform 
push, it is highly recommended that member states in the European Union 
develop a rigid point system that every member state adheres to, there are 
strict guidelines on how to enforce the sanctions, and there is increased 
transparency between the member states on how each state improves their 
imposition of sanctions on offending countries.127 Additionally, it is 
recommended that a fine, penalty, or some other deterrent force is imposed 
upon member countries who do not readily comply with the new 
sanctioning procedures.128 
Along similar lines, countries who do threaten sanctions upon 
countries who continue to practice shady fishing practices involving 
transshipment need to follow through with further actions to disincentive 
countries from continuing. Many times, both the EU and the United States 
have threatened sanctions, civil and criminal penalties, as well as other 
consequences for continuing with IUU fishing or other nefarious behavior 
within the fishing industries without following through on those threats 
when the country in question failed to change fishing behaviors to reflect 
appropriate standards.129 This practice of giving empty threats that do not 
carry any teeth allows the country to continue using the same practices as 
before, without any penalty being imposed. Following through on the 
threats, however, will hinder those countries currently being targeted by 
the EU and the United States and send a warning out to other offending 
countries that follow through will occur if threats are made and changes 
do not happen.    
Additionally, both member countries within the European Union as 
well as the United States should increase the fine amounts imposed on 
violating countries to increase their deterrent effects.130 Given that one of 
the major weaknesses behind past sanctions was the weak deterrent value 
of the fines previously imposed because of their low cost, strict 
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implementation of higher fines is highly recommended, because it would 
increase the cost of continuing such practices until the costs become 
sufficiently higher than the benefit of continuing shady transshipment 
practices would be.131 
 Governments should also incentivize private businesses who do 
purchase their fish supply from suppliers who practice responsible fishing 
practices involving increased surveillance on ships, strict transshipment 
practices, and meeting minimum work place conditions.  This would 
foreseeably increase the number of companies willing to commit to 
banning transshipment at sea through their supply chains.132 Through 
either penalizing businesses that do not take steps to address the issue or 
by giving companies who do purchase their fish from responsible 
suppliers, more businesses can be effectively incentivized to partake in 
safe catching and fishing practices, combining private and public action to 
form a more aggressive attack on the underlying issue.133  
Finally, it is recommended that world leaders not only threaten and 
impose sanctions upon countries with fishing industries that are caught 
committing human rights violations, but penalize those who do not remain 
transparent in their practices. Tactics in implementing this strategy 
include: increasing camera surveillance on ships, particularly on small 
vessels who remain the least regulated and, consequently, more open to 
abuse; requiring companies to keep detailed records on the timing and 
location of their routes; installing tracking devices; digitalizing records; 
and requiring all ships have a unique identifier onboard the vessel that 
serves the function of increasing transparency on board fishing vessels, 
which increases the accountability of those industries as well.134 
Sanctioning countries that do not partake in measures that increase 
transparency should sufficiently incentivize them to do so, which will 
either decrease instances of abuse through the Hawthorne Effect or 
increase awareness of instances of abuse, giving world leaders more 
knowledge relating to such abuses, with which they can pursue further 
action.135  
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A. Application: Argentina Case Study 
 A hypothetical application of these general principles can be tested 
on a current transshipment hotspot to further illustrate the point; namely, 
Argentina. Currently, off the coast of Argentina, approximately two 
hundred to five hundred fishing boats are searching the limits of 
Argentina’s Exclusive Economic Zone for fresh catch.136 Primary actors 
include fishing boats from China, Spain, and South Korea, among many 
others from various countries around the world.137 Most of these ships are 
engaging in transshipment practices while they do so, opening up the door 
to IUU fishing, human rights violations, and decreasing surveillance over 
fishing practices.138 Further, many of these ships are using inadequate 
fishing practices and systems and are changing their forms of 
identification, such as names and flags, to avoid being recognized, fined, 
or caught while engaging in nefarious activity, including commission of a 
wide variety of human rights abuses.139 Applying the proposed 
recommendations to the Argentina case study will illustrate how human 
rights violations can be effectively eradicated during the transshipment 
process.  
 First, EU member countries, as well as the United States, need to 
come together in sanctioning countries caught fishing off the coast of 
Argentina who are suspected of trafficking practices during transshipment. 
A unified approach is vital to present as strong of a defense against the 
activity as possible. Further, strict enforcement needs to be agreed upon 
amongst member countries and applied uniformly. Given that many 
countries decide not to enforce sanctions or, when sanctioning countries, 
set the cost so low the effectiveness of the sanctioning process is diluted,140 
an enforceable agreement between sanctioning countries is highly 
recommended, with accountability from other member countries in the EU 
in place, increasing the strength of the threat of sanctions. 
 Second, an in-depth study on the projected savings of fishing 
companies engaging in transshipment over using ethical means needs to 
be estimated and the sanctions placed on countries permitting unethical 
transshipment processes need to cost more than that amount. Historically, 
low sanction costs have rendered the sanctioning process ineffective, 
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because the sanction costs have cost participating countries less than 
abandoning current fishing practices would.141 This needs to be flipped for 
sanctions to become a more effective way of curtailing illegal fishing 
practices. The cost of continuing needs to be outweighed by the cost of 
change enough to effectively force countries engaging in or permitting 
unethical transshipment practices to change their behavior and ultimately 
become both more open and ethical with their fishing practices.  
 Third, not only do sanctions need to be placed on countries who 
knowingly permit their fishing industries to engage in inhumane practices 
during transshipment, but sanctions also need to be placed on countries 
who do not require their fishing boats to remain transparent. Expectations 
regarding surveillance on board, tracking devices placed on ships, the 
amount of time ships can stay abroad without returning to shore, and 
meticulous data tracking all need to be set by the EU and the United 
States.142 In the Argentina example, countries currently known for their 
lack of transparency in transshipment practices off the coast of Argentina, 
such as China, South Korea, and Spain need to be informed of these 
expectations of transparency.143 The EU and the United States must make 
threats of sanctions if the expectations are not met. If these countries 
continue to employ transshipment practices lacking transparency and set 
ethical standards, sanctions need to be implemented; empty threats of 
sanctions are insufficient to curtail the problem.  
 Finally, the private sector needs to be incorporated into the solution 
as well. Businesses need incentives, whether it be tax or otherwise, for 
purchasing from suppliers they know are committed to ethical fishing 
practices.144 Though industry leaders such as Thai Union, Nestle, and Mars 
have already committed to eradicating labor abuses, lack of transparency, 
and banning transshipment through their supply chains, the response from 
the business sector has ultimately been mixed, with actions from watchdog 
groups and pockets of public awareness.145 Increasing the tax breaks 
companies who refuse to purchase from fishing industries engaging in the 
non-transparent transshipment actions off the coast of Argentina or, 
conversely, penalizing companies who continue to purchase their supply 
fish from this source will ultimately incentive more industry leaders to 
look for fish in places where transparency, transshipment, and poor 
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working conditions are not an issue. Further, combining the private and 
public sectors in aggressively correcting shady transshipment practices 
currently operating off the coast of Argentina.   
 The problem of transshipment off the coast of Argentina is large and 
complex, but far from unsolvable. A unified force bonding various 
influential countries around the world and combining the public and 
private sectors can be assembled and enforced to solve transshipment 
issues wherever they occur, including off the coast of Argentina. A 
combination of instituting strict guidelines for sanctions across the board 
that are actively enforced by a large number of countries, targeting ships 
who lack transparency and surveillance, increasing the sanctions’ costs, 
and incentivizing private corporations to play a role in rooting out 
transshipped fish through its supply chain will ultimately lead to a stronger 
defense implemented in countering the issue of transshipment and the 
human rights violations it often breeds.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Transshipment, the process of offloading catch from a fishing vessel 
onto a larger refrigerated cargo ship often while on the high seas, has led 
to a wide array of human rights abuses taking place throughout the fishing 
industry, including: poor working conditions, slave labor, physical abuse, 
human trafficking, and murder.146 Reasons for this abuse include: the 
lower cost of using slave labor that incentivizes the practice, the lack of 
transparency and surveillance on board smaller fishing vessels, the 
sparsity of returns back to shore by those vessels, and the lack of laws on 
the books regarding transshipment on the high seas.147 Though several 
watchdog groups have taken notice of this over the past several years, little 
has been done to counter these human rights abuses.148 Accordingly, swift 
action is needed to counter these threats to human rights abuses create a 
more ethically driven fishing industry internationally.  
 Because of the lack of transparency and surveillance on board fishing 
vessels engaging in transshipment practices, data regarding the scale and 
                                            
 146.  The Global View of Transshipment: Revised Preliminary Findings, supra note 3, 
at 1.  
 147.  Id.  
 148.  See generally Mike Gaworecki, To Help Stop Illegal Fishing, Ban Practice of 
Transshipment on High Seas, Researchers Say, Mongabay (May 1, 2017),  https://news.
mongabay.com/2017/05/to-help-stop-illegal-fishing-ban-practice-of-transshipment-on-
high-seas-researchers-say/ [https://perma.cc/NQ42-4B9K] (stating that watchdog groups 
such as Oceana, Global Fishing Watch, SkyTruth, and the journal of Marine Policy have 
taken notice of the issue of transshipment and brought public attention to the issue).  
2019] Human Rights: Transshipment 57 
 
scope of transshipment and the human rights violations that occur during 
the process remains difficult to acquire.149 Further, because most abuses 
happen on the high seas where no specific country has territorial control, 
there is only a limited patchwork of regulations over transshipment 
practices.150 These regulations remain difficult to enforce, given the lack 
of surveillance on the ships that makes it difficult to ascertain when and 
where human rights violations occur, as well as the fact that many 
violations occur in places where no one country has jurisdiction, rendering 
the existing regulations inapplicable.151  
 There are many proposed solutions for countering human rights 
abuses on the high seas, all of which have their strengths and weaknesses. 
That said, of the strategies proposed in the past, the strongest strategy is 
the imposition of sanctions, which involves goods and services coming in 
from countries engaging in shady transshipment practices that are 
currently trading with other countries having trading restrictions and costs 
imposed until they change their behavior. Regarding IUU fishing, 
sanctions have been threatened and placed on both Thailand and New 
Zealand, ultimately leading to corrected behavior from both countries that 
ultimately rooted out shady practices that created situations where human 
rights violations were frequently taking place.152 
 Though sanctions have produced the desired result in the past, many 
weaknesses exist behind past applications of sanctions by both the United 
States and the European Union. Weaknesses such as inconsistent 
application, too low of costs imposed, lack of follow through with threats 
when sanctions are threatened, lack of set criteria to judge behavior by, 
and the unwillingness of certain countries in the EU to enforce the 
sanctions have collectively rendered sanctions not as effective as they 
otherwise could be in addressing this issue.153 Thus, a more 
comprehensive solution to the transshipment problem involves 
recognizing these shortcomings behind past approaches and developing 
improved strategies with them in mind, effectively curtailing unethical 
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behavior by imposing large economic disincentives upon those who 
continue such practices.  
 Addressing the transshipment problem will require many countries, 
especially developed and powerful nations such as those in the European 
Union and the United States, coming together and following through with 
implementation of sanctions with high enough costs to strip whatever 
economic incentives exist within current transshipment practices that 
produce human rights violations. Sanctioning countries must expand 
threatened sanctions to countries known for human rights violations, and 
countries who do not foster fishing practices with a high level of 
transparency and surveillance on board, because lack of transparency and 
surveillance is often a breeding ground for such abuses. Finally, the private 
sector and businesses need to be rewarded for keeping illegally caught fish 
out of their supply chain.  
 Though the problem with transshipment remains massive and 
complex, it is solvable. That said, it will require stable enforcement of 
sanctions, and other tactics to disincentive continuing the practice from a 
large pocket of the world for steady progress to occur and, eventually, stop 
human rights abuses from happening against some of the world’s most 
vulnerable people trapped in the practice. 
 
